Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture
Richard D. Friedman∗

INTRODUCTION
In this essay, I will offer some thoughts on how we might reframe
the issues governing the admissibility of expert evidence. My
principal focus is not on any particular type of expert evidence but on
broader questions: the extent to which we ought to rely on rulings of
admissibility, the standards that should govern admissibility rulings,
and the role of the trial and appellate courts in making those rulings.
To some extent, I will concentrate on the context of criminal cases,
but for the most part my conclusions apply in both civil and criminal
litigation.
Here are my conclusions:
First, the standards for treatment of expert evidence should
differ depending on the litigation context. Standards should be very
lenient for criminal defendants, and tougher for prosecutors, with
the standards for civil litigants somewhere in between.
Second, more than has been the case, the test that carries the
bite with respect to expert evidence should be one of sufficiency
rather than of admissibility.
Third, the model created by Daubert v. Merrell Dow
1
2
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and General Electric Company v. Joiner, and
3
extended by Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael, in which trial
courts, reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, act as
gatekeeepers to prevent jurors from being bamboozled by unreliable
evidence, is not a useful one. Reliability is an inappropriate,
misleading standard for testing the admissibility of expert evidence.
It does not reflect the way we should think about admissibility issues,
∗
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and it ought to be discarded. Moreover, trial courts are not well
positioned to sort the good from the bad. Where it is appropriate to
exclude evidence, the decision usually should be made as a matter of
law. This is because the difficulties that are most likely to warrant
exclusion usually share either or both of these characteristics: (i) they
are recurrent matters (including the behavior of repeat players) for
which a consistent resolution across cases is appropriate; or (ii) they
involve errors, particularly inferential errors, in the way the evidence
is presented that make it affirmatively misleading.
Fourth, in some settings, as a less restrictive alternative to
exclusion, courts should admit expert evidence but explain to the
jury factors limiting the weight that the jury should accord the
evidence.
I believe that we should be considerably more generous than we
have been with respect to expert evidence offered by the defense,
and the net effect of my suggestions would probably be greater
generosity with respect to expert evidence offered in civil cases. With
respect to the principal focus of this article, expert evidence offered
by a prosecution, my overall aim is not to argue that we should be
more or less generous than we have been. But I do believe we need
to restructure the way we think about the admissibility of such
evidence. Sometimes the courts should exclude such evidence as a
matter of law because it is affirmatively misleading, or because
exclusion will induce the presentation of better evidence. Sometimes
the trial court should admit the evidence but comment adversely on
it. Sometimes the court should deem the evidence admissible but
nevertheless hold that the evidence taken as a whole does not
support a verdict. But if none of these principles apply and the
expert evidence has significant probative value the court should not
exclude it on the ground that it is unreliable, and rarely if at all
should the court exclude it on the mere ground that the jury is likely
to over-value it. Thus, I am suggesting that Daubert be squeezed out
of the picture by other approaches to the problem.
I. DIFFERENTIAL STANDARDS
I am one of several participants in this symposium contending
that the standards for treatment of expert evidence in criminal cases
ought to be different from those in civil cases. Furthermore, I believe
the standards in criminal cases for evidence offered by an accused
should differ from those applicable to evidence offered by a
prosecutor.
Although the rules of evidence are, for the most part, the same
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for criminal and civil cases, at least on their face, there are numerous
settings in which the rules apply differently depending on whether
4
the case is a civil or a criminal one. In some of the most significant
of these settings, the application of the rules in a criminal case
depends on whether the offering party is the accused or the
5
prosecutor. I do not necessarily mean to defend each of these rules
or the distinctions they draw; some are surely good, others may not
be. But they do suggest rather strongly that there is no principle that
demands uniform application of evidentiary rules across types of
cases or symmetry within criminal litigation. Indeed, asymmetries are
6
rife throughout our criminal justice system.
Moreover, the argument for a greater degree of differentiation
in standards seems powerful. Part of the reason for distinguishing
between civil and criminal evidentiary rules, and between the rules
governing prosecutors and defendants, is that, as Paul Giannelli
emphasizes in his contribution to this symposium, criminal and civil
procedures are so different, and the position of a prosecutor is so
different from that of an accused, in such crucial matters as discovery
and resources of the parties. Part of the reason, which I shall discuss
in more detail later, is the “best evidence” concern arising from the
“repeat player” phenomenon. Prosecutors, and the experts whose
evidence they present, are the classic repeat players, and exclusion of
evidence may sometimes be warranted to induce them to present
better evidence; this factor is less likely to be strong in the case of
7
evidence with respect to civil litigants or criminal defendants. And
part of the reason, the part that I regard as most important, is a
matter of decision theory, the different consequences of various
decisions.
I take it as common ground that the very high standard of
persuasion in criminal cases—“beyond a reasonable doubt”—is based

4
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6
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5
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largely on the shared perception that the social cost of an inaccurate
judgment, given that the defendant is in fact innocent, is many times
greater than the social cost of an inaccurate judgment given that the
defendant is in fact guilty. The “more likely than not” standard that
governs most civil litigation is similarly based on the sense that an
error in favor of one civil litigant is about as bad as an error in favor
of the other. This difference, I have argued elsewhere, should not
only guide the jurors’ decision of the case once it is presented to
them, but should also play out in the doctrines governing evidentiary
and other procedural decisions: If we have a choice between two
rules regimes, and the first yields more accurate pro-prosecution
verdicts than the second, but at the price of a greater number of
inaccurate pro-prosecution verdicts, we should be very wary. A rule
that is pro-prosecution—say, admitting prosecution evidence or
excluding defense evidence—is preferable to the alternative rule only
if the increase that it causes in accurate pro-prosecution verdicts far
8
exceeds the increase in inaccurate pro-prosecution verdicts.
The arguments presented by Professors Park and Lillquist have
forced me to recognize that the situation is considerably more
complex than I had initially believed. One can rather easily imagine
facts that would justify a standard for admissibility of a given type of
evidence offered by the prosecution that is no greater than the
standard applicable when the same type of evidence is offered by the
defense. Assume, for example, that the evidence, whether offered by
the prosecution or by the defense, has substantial probative value but
will be over-valued by the jury. This means that when the prosecution
introduces the evidence it will cause some guilty verdicts that would
not occur absent the evidence, and that among these are some that
are justified by a sound view of the evidence and some that are caused
by the jury’s over-valuation. Similarly, when the defense introduces
the evidence, it will cause some not-guilty verdicts that would not
occur otherwise, and among these there will be some that are
justified by the evidence and others as to which the over-valuation is
an indispensable cause. Now, assume that most of the defendants as
to whom the challenged type of evidence is offered—whether by the
prosecution or by the defense—are in fact guilty. Thus, even though
over-valuation of prosecution evidence causes some defendants to be
found guilty who would not be found guilty absent over-valuation, the
fact is that most of these defendants are in fact guilty. And even
though proper use of defense evidence leads to acquittal of some
8
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defendants who otherwise would be found guilty, the fact is that most
of these defendants are guilty as well. It is not clear that a differential
standard is justified.
I find considerable force to this argument—though sketching it
out in this brief and informal way does not give it full credence—but
for at least three reasons it does not yet persuade me. First, however
true may be the assumption that most defendants are guilty, I doubt
the propriety of making the choice of rules dependent on it.
Arguably, doing so violates the presumption of innocence, or at least
the premises underlying that presumption. But even putting that
problem aside, doing so seems to create a pernicious incentive.
Using the assumption of probable guilt to choose rules makes it more
likely that prosecutions will be successful. Thus, use of that
assumption encourages prosecutors to bring more marginal cases, in
which the probability of guilt is not so high. That is a harmful effect
in itself, and ultimately it undermines the very assumption of
probable guilt on which the choice of a rule relatively generous to the
prosecution is based.
Second, it seems to me that the prosecution’s standard of
persuasion may take on independent importance of its own, not fully
9
reflected in the weighing of probabilities.
Third, if we are to speculate, I believe that the array of cases
more likely than not counsels in favor of greater lenience with
respect to defense evidence—or at least we cannot have substantial
10
confidence that this is not so.
9

Suppose, for example, we say that the weighing of social values is such that a
guilty verdict is justified only when the odds of guilt are at least as great as 20:1.
Once this standard has been adopted, it becomes significant in itself. Thus, though
it is clearly not so bad to find for the prosecution when the odds of guilt are 19:1
than when they are only 1:1, it may be significantly worse, not just a little worse, to
find for the prosecution when the odds of guilt are 19:1 than when they are 20:1.
10
The only cases that matter are the ones in which the challenged evidence
causes a change of verdict. Use Good-Pros to represent cases in which the
challenged evidence is offered by the prosecution and causes a beneficial change of
verdict. This change in verdict would be a good one because, even though by
hypothesis the jury over-values the evidence, a jury that gave it no more than an
appropriate weight would still find the evidence decisive. Use Bad-Pros to represent
cases in which the prosecution offers the challenged evidence and it is the jury’s
over-valuation that causes a change of verdict, a detrimental effect. Similarly, use
Good-Def and Bad-Def to represent the counterpart cases where the evidence is
offered by the defense.
Now, if the ratio of Bad-Pros to Good-Pros cases is greater than that of Bad-Def
to Good-Def cases, that would indicate that prosecution evidence should satisfy a
higher standard to be admissible. And there is some reason to believe that this
relationship does exist. Bad-Pros and Bad-Def cases start, before the challenged
evidence is offered, farther away from the line marked by the standard of persuasion
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I will not discuss these reasons in depth here. The issue is not
limited to the realm of scientific and expert evidence, the subject of
this symposium, and it is sufficiently complex and interesting to
warrant more focused and extensive attention than is appropriate
here; furthermore, to make a full presentation satisfactory to myself I
need to think the matter through more thoroughly than I have been
able to do thus far. For now, then, I will leave a promissory note of
sorts, a statement of intent to return to the matter in a separate
article, where I can give the matter fuller consideration. Meanwhile,
I acknowledge the force of at least some of the arguments of
Professors Lillquist and Park. Nevertheless, I adhere to the belief that
the differential in the costs of different types of error means that,
whatever the standard of admissibility should be, it should admit
11
defense evidence more readily than prosecution evidence, with the
test for civil litigation—in which the social cost of an inaccurate
judgment for one party is perceived to be about as bad as an
inaccurate judgment for the other—lying somewhere in between.
So far as expert evidence offered by an accused is concerned, I
believe the question of what test the courts should apply is a rather
simple one to answer: The test should be very lenient. As I have just
suggested, the overwhelming fear must be that unjustified exclusion
will lead to an inaccurate guilty verdict, not that unwarranted
admission will lead to an inaccurate verdict of innocence. That
means that the accused should be allowed to introduce evidence even
if the court is persuaded that it has very little merit. Such an
approach not only makes sense as a matter of measuring the
expected costs of error, but it also serves a valuable symbolic
function, demonstrating that an accused who has been convicted has
not been denied any plausible opportunity to leave the jury with a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. If the evidence is so clearly
worthless—phrenology, perhaps—that its presentation would be a

than do Good-Pros and Good-Def cases, respectively, because it is the increment of
over-valuation that carries them across that line. The standard of persuasion in a
criminal case requires an extremely high probability of guilt. Distributions tend to
be declining as one moves towards the extremes—suggesting that, among cases in
which challenged evidence will be decisive, the proportion that is close to the line
before that evidence is introduced is greater where it is the defense rather than the
prosecution that is offering the evidence.
11
If I am right about the importance in this realm of the difference in costs of
error, I think this factor would likely overwhelm some of the concerns raised by
Professor Park. He is concerned, for example, that a differential standard would
distort factfinding and be hard to explain. But if the differential admissibility
standard best takes into account the different costs of pro-prosecution and prodefendant error, these concerns are likely to be secondary.
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waste of time or an abuse of judicial process, exclusion would be
warranted. But rarely will defendants be motivated to offer such
egregious evidence, because it tends to makes them look foolish and
desperate. Moreover, there is no need to finance folly: Defendants
should not benefit from public financing of expert evidence that the
court regards as having little value.
Determining the appropriate standard for admissibility with
respect to prosecution evidence or evidence offered in a civil case is, I
12
believe, a much more difficult matter.
II. SUFFICIENCY RATHER THAN ADMISSIBILITY
Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho were all decisions about admissibility,
but they all involved sufficiency considerations, and perhaps they
should have been explicitly about sufficiency rather than about
admissibility. In each case, the trial court held the challenged
evidence inadmissible and in light of that decision granted summary
judgment for the defendant. I think it would have been better in
each case to hold the evidence admissible and yet grant summary
judgment for the defendant, as some of the courts in Bendectin cases
13
have done. Perhaps in Joiner and Kumho it would have been better
yet to hold the evidence admissible and not grant summary judgment
for the defense, but I put that question aside. My main points are
that what I think really motivated the courts in these cases was
assessments of the evidence as a whole, that the decisions would have
been better if they had been articulated in that way, that treating
them as matters of admissibility tends to distort the standards for
admissibility, and that it is consistent with the judicial function to
grant judgment as a matter of law in cases of this sort.
I assume that in each of these three cases there was insufficient
evidence, apart from the challenged expert evidence, to support the
plaintiff’s case. Inadmissibility therefore implied insufficiency; by
holding the challenged evidence inadmissible, the courts
accomplished nothing different from what they would have done if
12

It may be, as Professor Giannelli contends, that in fact courts have been more
lenient with respect to prosecution evidence than with respect to defense evidence.
See Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1071 (2003). If so, that is a perverse result.
13
See, e.g., Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir.1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1193 (1994); Michael D. Green, The Road Less Well Traveled (And
Seen): Contemporary Lawmaking in Products Liability, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 377 (1999);
Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances
Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 643
(1992).
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they had held the challenged evidence admissible and yet held the
entire body of evidence insufficient as a matter of law.
But now alter the cases somewhat. Suppose in Daubert there was
substantial and plausible, but disputed, epidemiological evidence that
Bendectin was a human teratogen. It seems clear to me that in such a
case the animal and in vitro studies that were ultimately held
inadmissible in the Daubert litigation should be admitted. Or suppose
that in Joiner or in Kumho the testifying expert gave his testimony by
deposition and then died, and that subsequently the plaintiffs were
able to develop sufficient evidence, apart from the challenged
testimony of the deceased experts, to support a verdict. In such a
case, the admissibility decision would look very different from the way
it looked in the actual case. In Joiner, the attitude of the courts might
be not that Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum was trying to accomplish by ipse
dixit an inferential leap that was unjustified by evidence but that his
view as an experienced toxicologist deserved some consideration
among the mix of evidence bearing on the question of whether PCBs
promote cancer. Similarly, in Kumho Dennis Carlson’s testimony was
obviously riddled with problems, but the courts might have regarded
it as worth some consideration given that there was a genuine factual
dispute, that he had considerable expertise in the area of dispute,
and that his assessment pointed in the same direction as a substantial
body of evidence. If this analysis is right, it suggests that cases like
Daubert, Joiner and Kumho distort the admissibility standard to achieve
a sufficiency result, and that the admissibility standard that they
articulate is too stringent.
But if a court holds expert testimony asserting a proposition
admissible, could it then grant judgment as a matter of law against
the party that bears the burden of producing evidence of that
proposition? I suspect that a good deal of the resistance to greater
reliance on admissibility standards stems from the perception that
this would be inappropriate. After all, if a percipient witness testifies
to personal knowledge of a given fact, that is sufficient evidence for
the jury to find that fact to be true. It is within the province of the
jury to find the witness credible, and so to conclude that the witness is
accurately reporting what she observed. But I do not believe the
same analysis applies with respect to an expert witness. An expert
who is not testifying as a percipient witness is, by hypothesis, stating
inferences that she hopes to lead the jury to adopt. It is standard fare
for judgments as a matter of law to hold that the evidence does not
support a given inference. I believe there is no good reason why a
court should not make such a ruling with respect to expert evidence.
In effect, the court would be ruling,
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I thought that this expert’s evidence would be of assistance to the
jury, and if there were more evidence supporting her conclusions
it probably would have been. But looking at this evidence
together with all the other evidence that the proponent has
presented, the jury could not reasonably conclude that the
proponent has met its burden of persuasion. And so I am
granting judgment as a matter of law.

If this approach to judgment as a matter of law appears rather
aggressive, it is important to bear in mind that it is actually approved
by Daubert. In the portion of the opinion rejecting the Frye test, and
so tending to minimize rather than maximize the gatekeeping role of
the court, Daubert emphasized the power of courts to grant judgment
as a matter of law against a party when all the evidence considered
14
together would not support judgment in that party’s favor.
One further advantage of this approach is that it shows greater
respect to the jury. If the challenged evidence has any value, as I am
arguing it did in cases like Joiner and Kumho, then ruling that it is
inadmissible often amounts to a determination that, notwithstanding
its value, the danger that the jurors will over-value it is so great that it
is better to shut their eyes and ears to it than to let them use it for
what it is worth. By contrast, a ruling of insufficiency entered before
verdict says that because there is no legitimate way that the jury can
reach a given conclusion there is no need to give them the
opportunity. The same ruling entered after a verdict says that
because the jury could have reached its conclusion only by failing to
perform its function properly it must have so failed; unlike the ruling
of inadmissibility, it does not presume that the jury is likely to act
erroneously or incompetently, but rather concludes on the basis of
the jury’s actual decision that it must have done so.
I have concentrated in this part of my discussion on the recent
Supreme Court cases, which are all civil ones. But it seems to me the
argument for greater reliance on sufficiency rulings is, if anything,
stronger with respect to prosecution evidence. Given that the
prosecution’s standard of persuasion is so high, there is plenty of
room for a ruling that the jury could not reasonably find that the
standard has been met. Often in criminal cases expert evidence is
offered to prove identity. Courts ought to be willing to rule that,
even though the expert evidence offered by the prosecution is
admissible, the entire body of prosecution evidence does not support
a finding that beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant was the
perpetrator.
14

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96.
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Can we have confidence that the courts will perform very well
the function of determining when the evidence taken as a whole, of
which disputable forensic evidence is an important part, supports a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? Perhaps not, but if the
courts do not perform this function well, what basis is there for
believing that they will perform well the function of holding
inadmissible evidence that will be detrimental to truth
determination? There is some reason to believe that the courts can
perform sufficiency determinations better than admissibility
determinations (as those decisions are now made), because
sufficiency is determined as a matter of law, and that means that the
trial court’s decision is subject to de novo review. I will speak further
about the advantages of such review later.
Note that I have said that greater emphasis should be put on
sufficiency rulings. I do not contend that such rulings should do the
whole job—that is, that courts should freely admit expert evidence on
the thought that if it creates a problem a sufficiency ruling will
address it. Such an approach would leave wide open the possibility
that, although there is enough evidence to support a verdict for the
plaintiff or prosecutor, the evidence in question will be detrimental
to truth determination. Thus, it is possible that, although the jury
could find the accused guilty on the basis of the evidence apart from
the challenged evidence, the jury would not do so, but the jury would
be persuaded to convict by evidence that should not have such a
strong persuasive impact. As my colleague Sam Gross has pointed
out in conversation, the typical situation may be one in which there is
weak witness identification evidence and vivid forensic evidence of
identification that if fully understood isles persuasive than it might
appear. In such a case, the witness’s testimony is enough to preclude
a judgment that the prosecution evidence is insufficient as a matter of
law, but it may be that the jury puts little weight on that testimony.
And yet, if the forensic evidence is admitted, the jury may determine
on the basis of that evidence that the prosecution has proven guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Some mechanism should be in place to
minimize this possibility.
III. RELIABILITY
Daubert pronounced that “under the Rules the trial judge must
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is
15
not only relevant, but reliable.” This doctrine seems to fit well with

15

Id. at 589.
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the Court’s approach to hearsay and confrontation, which likewise
emphasizes the reliability of evidence. In my view, it is badly
mistaken.
What does reliability mean? I think a fair definition, consonant
with the use of the term in everyday use, is that an item of evidence is
reliable proof of a phenomenon if the existence of the evidence
indicates a high probability that the phenomenon is true. But this is
too rigorous a standard.
Note that reliability is not the standard generally applied for the
admissibility of evidence. Eyewitness testimony, for example, is
notoriously unreliable, but we do not exclude it for that reason. The
purpose of a trial is to give a factfinder the opportunity to decide the
facts on the basis of disparate items of evidence that might point in
conflicting directions; there is no necessity that any single item of
evidence be particularly reliable, or even very powerful. The whole
notion of a trial, and indeed the whole purpose of the factfinder, falls
away if we say that a given piece of evidence can be presented to the
factfinder only if it is reliable, because that would effectively mean
that the evidence could only be presented if it appears to the court
that the proposition that the evidence is offered to prove is highly
probable.
I must be careful not to argue against a strawman; we should
consider the possibility that some softer sense of reliability that could
be applied in this context states a useful standard for admissibility. I
do not believe such a softer standard is useful here, but let me try two
alternative meanings of the term.
One softer meaning of reliability would be particularly
applicable to trace evidence. Trace evidence, in the broad sense in
which I will use the term, is evidence that was, at least on the
proponent’s account, left by the events at issue. Most forensic
evidence in criminal trials consists of trace evidence. One could say
that trace evidence is a reliable indicator of a phenomenon if its
likelihood ratio is very high—that is, if the evidence is many times
more likely to arise given the phenomenon than given the absence of
the phenomenon. This is a softer definition because if the prior
probability of a phenomenon (that is, the probability of the
phenomenon as assessed absent the evidence in question) is very low,
then the posterior probability (the probability of the proposition
given the evidence) may not be very high even though the evidence
has a high likelihood ratio. But even this definition is too rigorous as
a standard for admissibility.
Consider microscopic hair comparison. This may be a waning
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type of evidence, because if microscopic comparison yields a result
mitochondrial DNA analysis usually (though not inevitably) will as
well, and the mtDNA analysis is generally considered to be more
accurate. But right now we are in a time window in which evidence
based on microscopic comparison is still often being offered and its
accuracy can be tested as against that of mtDNA. In a recent study
based on 170 examinations of questioned hairs and known samples,
examiners reached conclusions (either “association” or “exclusion”)
by both methods of analysis in 95 cases. Those cases broke down this
16
way:
TABLE 1

MtDNA
Association
Association

Exclusion

69

9

0

17

Microscopic Comparison
Exclusion

Let us assume that the mtDNA analyses were all accurate, and
further that these data indicate the probabilities of finding an
association by microscopic comparison given that the hairs are, or are
17
not, actually from the same source. Then the probability that if the
hairs are actually from the same source a microscopic comparison
will so indicate is very close to one hundred percent (69/69). The
probability that if the hairs are not from the same source the
comparison will indicate that they are is much lower, but still quite
substantial, 34.6 percent (9/26).
Now suppose that a prosecutor introduces evidence of a positive
result yielded by microscopic hair comparison. That does not appear
to me to satisfy even the alternative definition of reliability that I have

16

Max M. Houck & Bruce Budowle, Correlation of Microscopic and Mitochondrial
DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 964, 966 (2002). In four cases, either the
hair was insufficient for mtDNA analysis or the analysis was inconclusive and yet
microscopic comparison yielded a result, in two cases association and in two
exclusion. Far more frequently, the mtDNA test yielded a result, but either the
microscopic hair comparison was inconclusive or upon inspection the questioned
hair was not deemed suitable for microscopic examination.
17
These are simplifying assumptions. Thus, the probability of finding an
association by comparison given that the hairs are, or are not, from the same source
may depend on the context in which the comparison is made; the comparisons in
this study involved not hairs selected at random but questioned hairs involved in
actual investigations.
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18

given based on the likelihood ratio. That definition focuses our
attention on the rate of false positives, and it seems apparent that, at
least for evidentiary purposes, a test that yields a positive result in
nearly thirty-five percent of the cases in which the facts are negative
cannot usefully be described as reliable. This is especially so if the
factfinder begins (as the presumption of innocence requires before
19
the introduction of any evidence ) with prior odds strongly
indicating that the facts are negative.
And yet this evidence if properly explained has substantial
probative value. The likelihood ratio of a positive result by
microscopic comparison is 2.89 (100 ) 9/26). Assuming it is
independent of any other evidence, this evidence should cause the
factfinder to increase quite substantially the odds the factfinder
attributes to the proposition that the two hairs came from a common
source. Indeed, the evidence should cause the factfinder to multiply
20
those odds by 2.89. That is more powerful evidence than proof that
both the defendant and the perpetrator had blood type A, which has
21
Even
a likelihood ratio of about 2.5 and would be admissible.
evidence that has a much lower impact on the probability of a
material proposition may have ample probative value to warrant
admissibility.
I do not believe it much matters whether we characterize the
reason for so many false positives as inherent unreliability of
microscopic comparisons or imperfect performance by those who
perform it, or some combination of the two. The bottom line is that
microscopic comparison is very unreliable, even as measured by the
likelihood ratio, and yet if properly understood it can be very useful.
A final definition of reliability would equate it with consistency.
Under this standard, which is the way the term is used by scientists, a
test is reliable to the extent it generates the same results on repeated
18

A negative result, however, might be considered reliable. See infra note 20.
See Richard D. Friedman, A Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 873 (2000).
20
The FBI apparently finds microscopic comparison useful as an investigatory
device. Though Houck and Budowle decline to call microscopic comparison a
“screening” test, id. at 967, it appears that the FBI uses it in this way, because “very
few hairs that are microscopically excluded in typical casework are submitted for
mtDNA analysis.” Id. at 965. The data from their study indicate that this is a rational
decision: of the 17 pairings for which both analyses yielded a result and the result of
microscopic comparison was exclusion, in all 17 mtDNA analysis also indicated
exclusion.
21
See People v. Mountain, 495 N.Y.S.2d 944, 946-48 (1985) (overruling a prior
case that held that proof that the accused and the perpetrator had Type A blood, a
common type, is inadmissible because lacking probative value).
19
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runs under similar circumstances. But this definition hardly seems
useful as a guidepost to admissibility of evidence. Again, consider the
hair comparison data. The results of hair comparison do not, on
their face, appear to be consistent: When hairs not from a common
source are compared, a conclusion of no association is reached about
sixty-five percent of the time and a conclusion of association is
reached about thirty-five percent of the time. On its face, that is
hardly consistent. Conceivably, there is some latent explanation that
accounts for the apparent inconsistency. For example, suppose that
an omniscient observer recognizes that microscopic hair comparison
indicates that the two hairs are from the same source if and only if
the two hairs are (a) indeed from the same source, or (b) both from
males over 20 years old. Then the omniscient observer could say that
the comparison yields consistent results. But this consistency would
be of no avail to us if the explanation was not apparent to us; given a
positive result from the comparison, we would have no way of
knowing whether it was because the hairs were from a common
source or for some other unknown factor that tended to yield that
result.
One could devise other meanings of reliability. But if the term
needs to be stretched out of shape to yield a useful standard it
obstructs rather than advances analysis. I therefore regard the
reliability standard enunciated by Daubert as inappropriate, and the
incorporation of that standard in the 2000 amendment to Federal
Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702—requiring expert testimony to be “the
product of reliable principles and methods,” which the expert “has
applied . . . reliably to the facts of the case”—as unfortunate. The
better standard is the one that originally stood by itself in FRE 702
and still shares the Rule with the reliability standard—whether the
specialized knowledge in question “will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” If properly
explained, it appears that microscopic hair comparison evidence
satisfies this standard, and that should suffice for admissibility.

22

See, e.g., David Medoff, The Scientific Basis of Psychological Testing: Considerations
Following Daubert, Kumho, and Joiner, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 199, 200 (2003); D. Michael
Risinger & Jeffrey L. Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and
“Offender Profiling”: Some Lessons of Modern Cognitive Science for the Law of Evidence, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 193, 245 (2002) (equating reliability, as a technical term of art, to
consistency).
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IV. PREJUDICE
If the evidence creates an intolerable chance that it will cause
the factfinder to reach an inaccurate pro-prosecution conclusion,
then it should be excluded. One may reach this conclusion under
the basic decision-theoretic approach I have outlined above. It is also
suggested by the general standard of FRE 403, that if “the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,”
among other costs, substantially outweighs the probative value of the
evidence, it ought to be excluded. And the conclusion is also
indicated by the original standard of Rule 702, which I have just
quoted; if it is too likely that the challenged expert evidence will lead
the trier of fact astray, then the court should not deem that the
challenged evidence “will assist the trier of fact to understand the
[other] evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
I am sure that in some cases bad expert evidence does lead juries
to inaccurate pro-prosecution results. I do not believe, however, that
we have a good gauge on how rampant the problem is. Barry Scheck,
Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer, in a popularly oriented book, Actual
Innocence, present some interesting data gathered by the Innocence
Project purporting to show factors leading to convictions that have
23
been established as wrongful.
TABLE 2
Data from Scheck, Neufeld & Dwyer: Factors Leading to Wrongful
Convictions in 62 U.S. Cases

Mistaken ID
Serology Inclusion
Police Misconduct
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defective or Fraudulent Science
Microscopic Hair Comparison
Bad Lawyering
False Witness Testimony
Informants/Snitches
False Confessions
Other Forensic Inclusions
DNA Inclusions
23

52
32
31
26
21
18
17
15
15
15
5
1

BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 263 (2000).
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The data have been updated (with the addition of new cases
from the Innocence Project’s files) and reinterpreted (by
combination of some of the categories) by Michael Saks and his
24
colleagues:
TABLE 3
Factors Leading to Wrongful Conviction in 81 Cases

Erroneous Forensic Science
Fraudulent, Tainted Evidence
Mistaken Eyewitness Identification
Police Misconduct
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Bad Lawyering
False Confessions
Informants/Snitches
False Witness Testimony

53
25
60
26
32
23
15
14
14

It is difficult to know just how much to make of the data. I have
the greatest respect for the principal authors of both studies—Barry
Scheck, for example, is an old friend and a former colleague. But
Actual Innocence is a book of advocacy written by advocates, and it
presents the data in very conclusory form. Even assuming that a
given factor was present in a particular case, which may not always be
self-evident (what are the standards for determining “defective”
forensic science?), how do we know that the factor was one “leading
to” a wrongful conviction? How do we know, for example, that the
jury did not discount forensic science evidence that these writers later
describe as erroneous? And even if the factor did play a role in jury
decision-making, do we know whether it was in fact decisive, in the
but-for sense? I am not saying that these matters were not
determined, or that they are not determinable, just that the methods
are not made transparent.
Beyond this, how bad a problem do the data suggest expert
evidence presents? In effect, we have only an imperfect indication of
the numerator of a fraction, and nothing about the denominator. At
worst, the data reveal a few dozen terrible outcomes attributable to
forensic science. Of course, this may be the bare tip of the iceberg,
24

Michael J. Saks et al., Toward a Model Act for the Prevention and Remedy of
Erroneous Convictions, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669 (2001).
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and there may be many other such outcomes about which we are still
ignorant—but we really do not have a good basis for knowing how
many there are. Moreover, the data tell us nothing about how many
accurate pro-prosecution outcomes such evidence caused that might
not have been achieved but for such evidence. Note, for example,
that according to Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer, mistaken
identification is the leading cause of wrongful convictions—but we
would never seriously consider a rule broadly excluding identification
testimony.
Nevertheless, let us assume that the data indicate that forensic
science evidence poses a serious problem that requires some
attention. That is a plausible conclusion, and the re-combination of
categories by Saks et al. reinforces it. At the same time, such an
aggregation of data should not cause us to be too reductionist. There
are problems of different types, and they may warrant different
responses.
For example, consider “serology inclusion.” Scheck, Neufeld,
and Dwyer explain that this “refers to ABO and protein blood typing
25
of semen, saliva, and bloodstains.”
These are well-established
techniques, and I do not suppose anybody poses a serious objection
to their use; this is not a matter of “defective or fraudulent” science
or of junk science of any sort. So then what is the problem? If all
that happened is that the serology results strengthened the
prosecution case by indicating that the defendant was within a
limited category of persons who could have left an incriminating
stain, then perhaps there is no problem, or at least we cannot say that
anybody on the prosecution side did anything wrong. A rational
factfinder fully understanding the situation would conclude that this
evidence increased the probability that the defendant was guilty, even
though given fuller information the factfinder would conclude that
the defendant was not in fact guilty. Perhaps, though, the problem is
that the expert witness over-claimed the significance of the
serological result. If that is the problem, then the solution would not
be to exclude evidence of the underlying serological phenomenon,
but to try to prevent the over-claiming, or at least to ensure that the
jury is not misled by it. It does not seem to me that the Daubert
framework is of much help here.
26
The same analysis applies to microscopic hair comparison. I
25

SCHECK ET AL., supra note 23, at 263.
It also applies to at least some of the “Other Forensic Inclusions,” a category
that, according to Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer, “refers to the comparisons of
fingerprints, fibers, and other physical evidence,” and is significantly less
26
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have argued above that microscopic hair comparison does appear to
have significant probative value. There does not seem to be any
warrant for a general rule keeping such evidence from the jury. If
there is a problem it is presumably that the proponent of the
evidence claims that the evidence is more probative than it is.
Ideally, then, the problem can be prevented by avoiding such overclaims—not by excluding evidence of the comparison.
I assume that if jurors are given misinformation they are prone
to reach inaccurate results because of it. But I do not believe that we
have any good basis for concluding that if evidence such as
microscopic hair comparison—evidence that is imperfect but that
nevertheless has significant probative value—is accurately described
jurors will nevertheless so likely over-value it that it should be deemed
more prejudicial than probative. And even if jurors are likely to overvalue some evidence to that extent, I wonder how we can have
confidence that the courts will be able to sort out cases where this is
likely to happen from cases in which it is not. Furthermore, as I will
now argue, even if courts can sort out such cases, exclusion is not
necessarily the most appropriate remedy.
V. COMMENT AS A LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE
The primary remedies that our system offers for evidence that
might otherwise over-persuade the factfinder are responses by the
adversary—cross-examination, rebuttal, and argument. Assume that
a court believes that a given piece of expert evidence has substantial
probative value but that there is too great a chance that, even after
taking these responses into account, the evidence will over-persuade
the jury. Exclusion is not the inevitable remedy. Judicial comment,
expressing reasons to limit the significance of the evidence, seems
more appropriate. Coming from the court, such comment will not
likely be ignored. And yet it allows the jury to give the evidence some
troublesome. Id.
Fingerprint identification, by the way, seems to be a trivial source of mistaken
identification. Scheck, Neufeld and Dwyer seem not to have any particular difficulty
with it; they compare it favorably to hair identification, pp. 161-62, and in their
extensive series of recommendations as to how to prevent erroneous convictions, pp.
254-60, they make no suggestions as to fingerprints. I am inclined to believe that
United States v. Lera Plaza, 2002 WL 27305 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), vacated, 188 F.
Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002), addressed a problem that is not pressing in reality. If
the treatment of fingerprint evidence does not square with Daubert, as some,
including my collaborators in a recent exchange, have suggested, Richard Friedman
et al., Expert Testimony on Fingerprints: An Internet Exchange, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 91, 92 n.9
(2002), I believe the problem lies with Daubert rather than with the way fingerprint
evidence has been treated for decades.
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weight.
Courts traditionally have the power to comment on the
evidence. And yet they are hesitant to use the power, for fear of
encroaching on the jury’s function. But surely it encroaches less on
the jurors’ function to admit evidence that has some probative value
and give them reasons why they should not put too much weight on it
than to exclude the evidence altogether because they are too likely to
over-value it.
Comment rather than exclusion makes sense only if the
evidence has significant probative value. The availability of the
comment option leaves less room in which exclusion is the optimal
solution. In some cases, though, exclusion of at least part of a proffer
of expert evidence is warranted; perhaps the underlying
phenomenon has too little probative value to justify admissibility,
perhaps the expert’s assessment of it is misleading, or perhaps the
exclusion of this evidence will induce the production of better
evidence. The question then arises as to the responsibilities of trial
and appellate courts in making the decision to exclude.
VI. THE ALLOCATION OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY
In Joiner the Supreme Court held that the job of applying the
Daubert standard lies primarily with the trial court; its decisions are to
be reviewed for abuse of discretion. I believe that the role of
appellate courts should be greater in this realm than Joiner suggests. I
have already suggested one reason why: To a large extent, weak
expert evidence should be deemed to create a sufficiency problem
rather than an admissibility problem, and sufficiency issues are
treated as matters of law. Here, I will go further: When expert
evidence is to be held inadmissible, it should not usually be because
of a discretionary judgment by the trial court that the evidence is
more likely prejudicial than probative, but rather because admission
would be deemed erroneous as a matter of law. The trial court
should make the initial decision as to whether exclusion is
appropriate, of course. But that decision should often be reviewed de
novo by the appellate court.
I have already suggested an argument on one side of the coin: I
do not believe the type of weighing that we are used to leaving to trial
courts works well in this context. If expert evidence is not
affirmatively misleading, it may well have significant probative value,
and in the absence of a demonstrated reason to believe that the jury
will substantially over-value it there is probably no basis on which to
conclude that the evidence is more likely to hurt than to help truth
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determination.
Now, if we consider factors that sometimes do justify the
exclusion of expert evidence, I think the best conclusion is that the
determination should most often be made as a matter of law.
First, if the admissibility of evidence depends on the truth of a
proposition that is asserted to be scientific, then by definition that
proposition is one that has applicability beyond the bounds of the
case at hand, and probably it is one that will recur from case to case.
There is no good reason why such a proposition of scientific fact
should be deemed to be true in one case and not true in another
case. The proposition appears to be a matter of legislative fact or
perhaps, in the language of Professors Monahan and Walker, a social
27
framework; it is not in any event an adjudicative fact the significance
of which is confined to the case at hand. A ruling that runs across
cases seems appropriate.
Second, such recurrent matters tend to involve repeat players.
Indeed, with respect to prosecution evidence there is, almost by
definition, one significant repeat player—the prosecutor herself, the
party offering the evidence. Beyond this, other repeat players,
laboratories and testifying forensic experts, are almost always involved
in the creation of prosecution forensic evidence. The prominence of
repeat players makes it especially appropriate to apply best evidence
rules—that is, rules excluding evidence even if it would be more
probative than prejudicial because exclusion would likely induce the
creation of better evidence. Sometimes a best evidence rule is
focused largely on the case at hand: If unauthenticated evidence is
inadmissible, the proponent will probably be induced to present
authenticating evidence, and if a leading question is held improper
the proponent will probably ask non-leading questions.
The
involvement of repeat players makes it especially appropriate to apply
best evidence rules for broader reasons going beyond an individual
case: If the proffered evidence is excluded on the grounds that the
procedures in creating it were suboptimal, or that the proponent
could with sufficient effort make a showing of such matters as
proficiency, so that the factfinder could better assess the probative
value of the evidence, then better evidence is likely to be presented in
future cases. Such a rule of exclusion is based on a significant policy
determination, and it should be decided as a matter of law rather
than of discretionary judgment by the trial court.
Third, often the problem with scientifically-based evidence is not
27

See, e.g., Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987).
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in the phenomenon but in the explanation.
That is, the
phenomenon in question may indeed be an indicator, more or less
strong, of the proposition in question, but the difficulty occurs if the
testifying expert makes a misleading statement about what the
evidence shows. As discussed above, this appears to be the principal
problem with respect to evidence of microscopic hair comparison,
and it appears as well to be a significant problem with respect to
serological evidence. Moreover, it is a recurrent and serious problem
with respect to DNA evidence, for prosecution witnesses often
commit the “prosecutor’s fallacy” in describing the impact of the
28
evidence. This fallacy arises when the accused’s DNA matches that
of a crime scene sample and there is a small probability that such a
match would have arisen had the accused not been the source of that
sample. The fallacy consists of describing this evidence as if it
demonstrates that there is a small probability that the accused was not
the source of that sample. The witness has effectively treated the
probability of the evidence given the negation of the prosecutor’s
hypothesis as equal to the probability of that negation given the
evidence—but the two are not the same and may be different by a
very large order of magnitude.
A witness should be barred from committing such fallacies in
describing scientifically-based evidence. She should be barred on a
ground more definite than that the evidence is unreliable, or that it is
more prejudicial than probative, or that it is not helpful to the jury,
and she should be barred by a firmer standard than the discretion of
the trial court. She should be barred because her testimony is
demonstrably wrong, as a matter of logic—and therefore that
testimony, as compared to testimony that does not suffer from the
same illogic, can only hurt the truth-determination process. In
conjunction with this demonstrable wrongness, several other factors
warrant exclusion as a matter of law:
(a) The testimony is wrong on a basis that transcends the case at
hand.
(b) The witness is likely to be a repeat player—and even if she is
not, other witnesses who are repeat players will heed a ruling of
exclusion and learn to conform their testimony to its demands.
(c) Indeed, as rulings come from high courts all the professional
players in the system are likely to pay attention and be aware of the
28

See, e.g., William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of
Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s
Fallacy, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAVIOR 167 (1987); Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and
Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA Evidence at Trial, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (1993).
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problem so that it is less likely to arise, and more likely to be
corrected, in future cases. Thus, even if the prosecutor does not,
judges and defense lawyers are likely to ensure that the testifying
witness adheres to prescribed standards.
(d) Because the problem is a matter of logic, and the logic of
inference, it is likely that courts are at least as well situated as the
testifying expert to detect and understand the problem. Typically,
the testifying expert is not someone with a strong understanding of
probability theory. I do not claim that judges usually have such a
strong understanding, either. But logic should be something judges
are good at, at least if they put their minds to it, and they are
motivated to do a good job in monitoring the inferential process.
Finally, I believe rulings that will durably appear to be in
accordance with scientific truth will more likely result from
procedures in which appellate review is de novo rather than for abuse
of discretion. Matters are more likely to be briefed with greater care
in the appellate courts, especially because the incentives are greater if
a decision will determine the rule for a whole class of cases.
Appellate judges tend to have greater time for careful decisionmaking. The participation of a panel of judges—and ultimately of
the jurisdictions’ court of last resort—increases the chance that the
decision will be infused by good understanding of the situation. If
more than one trial court has gathered information on the matter,
the appellate court will be in a good position to draw on it.
The one significant advantage of trial procedure in this area, as
matters now stand in the United States, is that trial judges, unlike
appellate judges, are in a position to have an oral interchange with
experts, which might increase their understanding. But this, it seems
to me, is a problem easily enough corrected. Experts occasionally
appear before British appellate courts, and there is no reason in
principle why this should not happen in American appellate courts.
Indeed, I cannot find anything in the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure that would bar the practice; I leave to the side whether the
expert should testify under oath, as in the trial court, or argue like an
appellate attorney, or merely be present to answer questions of the
court. In most settings, there is no reason for a witness to testify
before the appellate court, or for anybody but the attorneys to
participate in argument, because the appellate court is not the
province for factfinding. But here our concern is legislative facts, or
matters that should be treated as the equivalents of legislative facts.
This means that appellate courts are the ultimate factfinders. I do
not see any reason that they should be limited to what they can glean
from the trial court record, the submissions of the parties, and their
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own independent research. If they have questions of scientific fact,
why should these questions not be openly explored before them?
Is there a danger that greater reliance in this area on lawmaking
by the appellate courts will be top-heavy and inefficient? I do not
believe so. Because we are talking about recurrent decisions, it is
more efficient to have a uniform rule, so that trial courts do not have
to go through the exercise each time of exercising their discretion on
a given point.
Is there, then, a danger that appellate decision-making will be
too ossified, too unlikely to change in response to changing scientific
knowledge? There should not be. If an appellate court rules a given
way on an issue of admissibility based on its perception of scientific
fact, new evidence as to scientific truth would create a new situation.
Presumably appellate courts would be reluctant to alter the impact of
recent decisions too rapidly, because that would undercut the
purpose of appellate decision-making. But an appellate court
provided with fuller or more updated information than was available
to a prior court can reach a different result without overruling the
prior court. There is no inconsistency if a factfinder reaches
different results in two cases that on the facts are largely similar but
different in some material respect. And the same is true with respect
to decisions by a court in cases in which the legislative facts bear some
material dissimilarity.
CONCLUSION
I have suggested in this article that we restructure the way we
think about the admissibility of expert evidence. I have focused
largely on criminal cases, but my conclusions are more general.
I have suggested that Daubert should be squeezed, from several
directions.
In some cases, the courts should simply admit the evidence,
notwithstanding doubts about its reliability, and let the jurors do with
it as they will; that the jury might reach different conclusions from
the court is the whole reason why we have a jury. This is especially so
with respect to defense evidence.
In some cases, even though the court admits the evidence it
might decide to make a comment expressing reasons why the
evidence should not be given too much weight. Such a comment is
less restrictive than exclusion and generally preferable if the evidence
has substantial probative value.
In some cases, the court should decide that the challenged
evidence is admissible and yet conclude that as a matter of law the
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evidence taken as a whole does not satisfy the burden of proof
imposed upon the prosecutor (or, in a civil case, upon the claimant).
When we have taken account of all such cases, there will still be
others in which the expert evidence should be held inadmissible. But
when this is appropriate it should be, at least most often, as a matter
of law. If the underlying phenomenon has too little value as an
indication of the proposition at issue to warrant admissibility, or the
expert’s explanation is affirmatively misleading, or best evidence
considerations counsel exclusion to induce the production of better
evidence in this or subsequent cases, then exclusion should be
justified as a matter of law. And if these conclusions do not hold,
then exclusion is probably not warranted.
At the end of the day, taking all these possible resolutions into
account, I do not believe there is any scope, or at least not much, in
which it is appropriate or necessary for the Daubert approach to apply.
That should not be surprising. It is by no means clear how significant
a problem juror over-valuation of expert evidence is, or whether
courts can effectively sort out evidence that jurors are likely to overvalue from evidence that they are not. So long as it is not
misleadingly explained, even evidence that is quite unreliable may
play a highly useful role in the truth-determination process.

